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Is the Issuance of a Passport
an Individual Right
or a Government Prerogative?
PAUL LANSING*
I. INTRODUCTION
An individual's right to freedom of international travel has been
overwhelmingly linked to his possession of a passport in the recent past.'
The passport has thus become an increasingly important document since
it was first introduced. Its importance has been further enhanced by the
technological innovations which have considerably decreased the time ele-
ment in travel to the point where man can virtually span the globe in a
matter of hours.' The history of the freedom to travel has been somewhat
obscure, varying from an early proclamation promoting the right of free
travel to more recent instances wherein the right to free international
travel has been limited for national security and foreign policy reasons.
One instance of the latter in the United States is the recent case in-
volving Philip Agee, a U.S. citizen and former employee of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).$ Agee, a resident of Hamburg, West Germany
at the time the case began, was a leading critic of the CIA's clandestine
operations throughout the world. He had written and spoken extensively
attacking American intelligence efforts, and had purportedly exposed the
identities of certain undercover CIA agents.' Agee had been issued a U.S.
passport in 1978; however, being aware of Agee's activities, the U.S. De-
partment of State moved to revoke it on December 23, 1979. This case
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assistance of Ma. Cathy Jones, J.D. Candidate, University of Iowa College of Law, in the
preparation of this article.
1. D. TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1972).
2. Id. at XV.
3. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980), afl'd sub nom. Agee v. Muskie, 629
F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), reu'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, U.S. __, 101 S.Ct. 2766 (1981).
4. 629 F.2d at 81.
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brought up a number of questions concerning an individual's right to
freedom of travel and whether it is protected by the U.S. Constitution.
This issue and others will be discussed in this article.
II. HiSTORIcAL ASPECTS OF THE FREEDOM TO TRAVEL
Originally, under the writ of Ne Exeat Regno,5 the British Crown
could restrain a subject from leaving the realm by providing that one
could leave the country only if royal permission had been granted in the
form of a license. This was a means of controlling the exit of individuals
from the country by the King and thereby enforcing feudal duties and
services." However, in 1215, clause 42 of the Magna Carta provided ac-
knowledgement of a distinct right to travel: "It shall be lawful in the fu-
ture for anyone to leave our kingdom, and to return safe and sound, by
land and by water, saving the allegiance due to us, except for a short
space in time of war. . ." Contrary to this acknowledgement, however,
succeeding kings retained the discretionary power to issue licenses to
those who wished to travel. But with the ascendance of the theory of the
natural rights of the individual, the discretionary power of the King to
require travel licenses diminished substantially.6 By 1607 the writ was no
longer in general use except when used as an equity instrument to insure
the whereabouts of debtors and defendants. s
The British travel licenses required by the writ are the origins of to-
day's passports. In the United Kingdom, the passport traditionally func-
tioned as a letter of introduction to foreign governments identifying the
bearer as a U.K. citizen. However, it now has assumed an additional func-
tion in that country by also serving as an exchange control voucher. 18 Un-
less a person can produce a passport, banks will not issue foreign cur-
rency to that person. Thus, severe limitations are imposed on the person
not in possession of a passport.
Another historical example of the use of passports is the case of In-
dia. India's experience is quite different from that of the United King-
dom. Until very recently, India lacked any formal regulation governing
the granting of passports to persons intending to leave the country, rely-
ing to a large extent on American jurisprudence for guidance." Prior to
1967, a passport was not required to leave the country. But since it was
and is a prerequisite for entry in other countries, a passport was a practi-
5. Williams, British Passports and the Right to Travel, 23 INr'L & Coup. L.Q. 642, 644
(1975).
6. Id.
7. MAGNA CaRTA § 42 (1215).
8. Parker, The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40 VA. L. Rav.
853, 867-68 (1954).
9. Note, The Right to Travel and the Loyalty Oath: Woodward v. Rogers, 12 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 387, 389 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Travel).
10. Williams, supra note 5, at 651.
11. D. TURACK, supra note 1, at 7.
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cal requirement to enable one to travel freely. The controversy whether a
citizen of India had the right to travel was determined in 1967 when the
Supreme Court of India decided that the citizen enjoyed such a right.12 In
response to this decision, the Indian government passed the Passport Act
of 196715 which made the passport a statutory requirement for free travel
and regulated the granting of passports. By this enactment, the Indian
government had begun to exercise its discretion over the travel rights of
individuals in its country.
The first American passport appeared on July 8, 1796, as a letter of
introduction to U.S. officials abroad."' A passport was not required by
law, but rather served as a privilege to citizens. Until World War I, the
American passport was thought to serve three main purposes. First, it was
evidence to both U.S. and foreign officials that the bearer was an Ameri-
can national. Second, it contained a request that the bearer be given aid
and protection by foreign governments in case of need. Third, the na-
tional abroad who held a passport was provided greater assistance by the
U.S. government than one who did not, which meant that the U.S. gov-
ernment was more likely to offer assistance to citizens who held a pass-
port."6 Today, however, only the first of these purposes remains valid
since international law has recognized that diplomatic protection is not
contingent upon the possession of a passport.16
Today, in addition to serving as a convenience to travellers, the
American passport has assumed a more important role. It presently
serves as an exit control mechanism and an important foreign policy in-
strument." In exercising discretion over the issuance of passports, the
U.S. government is directly able to restrict the foreign travel of American
nationals since gaining entrance to another country generally requires a
valid passport.
Except for a brief period during World War I when travel required
possession of a passport, prior to May 27, 1941 it was not illegal for U.S.
citizens to leave their country without a passport."0 The passport require-
ment was intended to apply only during wartime and to end with the
coming of peace. In 1941 Congress enacted legislation extending the war-
time passport requirement to include "national emergencies""' which
President Roosevelt declared to exist in the same year. Following the
coming of peace in 1945, the advent of the Cold War prevented the repeal
12. Id. at 8.
13. Comment, The Right To a Passport, 7 INDIA J. INT'L L. 526 (1968).
14. Note, Right to Travel, supra note 9, at 392.
15. Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. Rev. 129 (1966).
16. Turack, Selected Aspects of International and Municipal Law Concerning Pass-
ports, 12 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 805, 818 (1971).
17. Note, Passports and Travel: Towards a Rational Policy of Area Restriction En-
forcement, 8 HARv. J. LEGIS. 518, 527 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Passports and
Travel].
18. D. TURACK, supra note 1, at 9.
19. Ehrlich, supra note 15, at 131.
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of the passport requirement. The 1941 statute was replaced in 1952 when
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act.20 The Immigration
and Nationality Act authorized the President. to impose restrictions on
travel during wartime or any national emergency and made it a criminal
offense to enter or leave the U.S. without a valid passport.' Hence, the
denial of a passport became and today continues to be synonymous with
the right to travel abroad.
The Secretary of State has the power to grant or to deny the issuance
of a passport and therefore has the ability to control the foreign travel of
U.S. nationals." The Department of State carries out the function of is-
suing or denying a passport through its Passport Division." In the early
1950's passports were denied when the Department of State felt that the
applicant's travel abroad would not be in the best interests of the United
States. Frequently the applicant had no idea what the term "best inter-
ests" meant and the Secretary of State, alleging that the issuance or de-
nial of a passport was a function of the foreign affairs power, assumed its
actions were nonreviewable.2
4
Throughout the decade of the 1950's the number of passport restric-
tions based on national security or foreign policy grounds increased, and
the Passport Division began using its discretionary power arbitrarily."
Since the issuance of a passport was then deemed to be a foreign policy
decision, private citizens could not contest the denials."8 Any private citi-
zen who spoke against U.S. policies or the policies of U.S. allies risked the
chance of having his passport revoked.
These arbitrary actions, based on the premise that a passport deci-
sion is a foreign policy decision, affected basic constitutional rights and
therefore. came under the scrutiny of the courts. In Schachtman v. Dul-
les,27 the national chairman of the Independent Socialist League was re-
fused a passport solely because the organization was listed as subversive
by the Attorney General. The court of appeals held that the right to
20. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 215, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 &
Supp. I1 1979).
21. Id. § 1185 (a)-(b).
22. 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1980). A U.S. national is defined as "a citizen
of the United States or a noncitizen owing permanent allegiance to the United States." 22
C.F.R. § 51.1(d) (1981).
23. 22 C.F.R. § 51.1-.89 (1981).
24. See generally Hurwitz, Judicial Control Over Passport Policy, 20 CLRV. ST. L. R~v.
271 (1971); Note, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judi-
cial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 170 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Note, Passport Refusals].
25. Hurwitz, supra note 24, at 271.
26. The State Department both refused to renew certain passports and revoked others
in its efforts to prevent foreign travel. Ms. Beverly Hepburn's passport was not renewed
because she "allegedly engag[edl in the internal affairs of Guatemala." Id. at 274. Paul
Robeson had his passport revoked since the Government felt "if Robeson spoke abroad
against colonialism he would be a meddler in matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Secretary of State." Id.
27. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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travel was a
natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regula-
tion under law. A restraint imposed by the Government of the United
States upon this liberty, therefore, must conform with the provision of
the Fifth Amendment that '[nmo person shall be . . . deprived of...
liberty ...without due process of law.' s
Since Schachtman was granted an informal hearing prior to the passport
denial, the court focused upon the substantive due process question of
whether the refusal was arbitrary." The court held that under the cir-
cumstances, the denial was arbitrary and thus invalid.30
Similarly, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,3' ranking members of
the Communist party had their passports revoked under section 6 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,3' which provided that a mem-
ber of a Communist organization, which has registered or has been or-
dered to register, commits a crime by either applying for or attempting to
use a passport. In effect, the section provided a statutory basis for the
denial of passports because of political associations or beliefs. However,
the Court found the section "unconstitutional on its face" in that it
"sweeps too widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed
in the Fifth Amendment." 8 This decision effectively eliminated the State
Department's ability to withhold passports from Communists and estab-
lished the rule that one's political persuasion alone could not be em-
ployed to justify the Department's actions.8 '
28. Id. at 941.
29. Id.
30. The court acknowledged that in determining whether a decision was arbitrary one
must examine all the circumstances. Restraint upon travel abroad might be justified during
an emergency, but not during times of normalcy. The court further explained that the mere
listing of the Independent Socialist League on the Government's list of subversive groups,
coupled with their refusal to justify the listing, must be seen as an arbitrary act, "without a
reasonable relation to the conduct of foreign affairs." Id. at 943.
31. 378 U.S. 500 (1963).
32. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 6, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
33. 378 U.S. at 514. Among the reasons for their decision that the Act swept too
broadly were the following: (1) the terms of the Act "apply whether or not the member
actually knows or believes that he is associated with what is deemed to be a 'Communist-
action' or a 'Communist-front' organization," id. at 509; (2). the act applies regardless of
whether one believes he or she is associated with a group seeking to further the world com-
munist movement, id. at 510; (3) section'6 "renders irrelevant the member's degree of activ-
ity in the organization and his commitment to its purpose ... " id. at 510; (4) the prohibi-
tion of section 6 applies without considering the reasons for which the individual wishes to
travel abroad, thus prohibiting trips for medical or family reasons, id. at 511; (5) section 6
also applies "regardless of the security sensitivity of the areas in which (the member] wishes
to travel," id. at 512; (6) in promulgating the Act, it is clear the Government did not even
consider what less drastic methods might be available to achieve their desired goal, id. at
512-13.
34. Arguably, the State Department would still have the power to withhold passports
from Communists. But given the criteria upon which the Court based its decision, it is
doubtful that an effective act could be drafted and still be constitutional.
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Further, the Supreme Court in this case ruled that it is unjustifiable
to repress the travel rights of a "class of persons" for the sake of national
security.38 Therefore, although the State Department may refuse a pass-
port and thereby restrict travel on the basis of national security consider-
ations, its power and discretion in this area have slowly been eroded by
the courts. Unless the State Department sufficiently demonstrates the
danger to national security, the Department is essentially obligated to is-
sue passports to each applicant.
The State Department has been better able to justify passport refus-
als on behalf of the national interest for area restrictions than for individ-
ual or class restrictions. The area restrictions apply to all travellers who
desire to travel to "(1) [Al country with which the United States is at
war, or (2) A country or area where armed hostilities are in progress; or
(3) A country or area in which there is imminent danger to the public
health or physical safety of United States travellers."ss Area restrictions
are supported by two separate policies. One is that the State Department
does not want a U.S. traveller to become stranded in an area where the
normal diplomatic services of the United States would not be available.
Second, the restrictions prevent U.S. travellers from inadvertently touch-
ing off embarrassing foreign incidents by their presence in an area.
7
The government's power to forbid the travel of all citizens to particu-
lar geographic areas on the basis of national security was explicitly estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Zemel v. Rusk." In that case, the Secre-
tary of State refused to validate appellant's passport to travel to Cuba as
a tourist for the purpose of informing himself as to conditions there."
The Court considered whether the Passport Act of 1926 authorized the
Secretary of State to refuse to validate passports of U.S. citizens for
travel to Cuba and whether the exercise of the authority was constitution-
ally permissible. The Court upheld the action of the State Department
and held that the language of the Passport Act "[was] surely broad
enough to authorize area restrictions."' 0 Zemel, as distinguished from
previous cases, involved "foreign policy considerations affecting all citi-
zens."" Thus, the courts have held that area restrictions are authorized
but class restrictions are not."'
35. 378 U.S. at 509.
36. 22 C.F.R. § 51.72(a)(l)-(3) (1981).
37. See Note, Passports and Travel, supra note 17, at 520.
38. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the Court found an "administrative practice suffi-
ciently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclusion that Congress had implicitly
approved [area restrictions]." Id. at 12. In addition to the consistent administrative practice,
the fact that the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act left untouched the broad executive
power in this area was further support for the Court's acceptance of area restrictions.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 13.
42. The criminal punishment for visiting a banned country is up to five years imprison-
ment and/or a $5,000 fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(c) (1980).
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However, in 1967 the Supreme Court ruled that area restrictions are
not criminally enforceable by the State Department. In United States v.
Laub," the petitioner was indicted for conspiracy to violate the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act4 ' by arranging for a group of citizens, all of
whom possessed valid passports, to travel to Cuba. The Court decided the
case solely on the statutory level and concluded that, while the Passport
Act of 1926 authorized area restrictions, viQlation of the travel ban did
not trigger criminal sanctions. The criminal provisions of the Act penal-
ized only departures from the United States without a valid passport, and
a valid passport was not rendered invalid by State Department disap-
proval of travel to the particular destination." As long as the traveller
held a valid passport upon his return, he could not be punished for violat-
ing the restrictions. Once it was determined that criminal sanctions were
not allowed, the State Department turned to administrative sanctions. It
threatened to revoke and to not renew an individual's passport until it
was assured that the individual would not travel in violation of any
restriction."
This practice was declared invalid by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in Lynd v. Rusk." In Lynd, the appellant refused to give as-
surances that he would not travel to a restricted area without his pass-
port.48 The Secretary then revoked his passport. In not allowing this revo-
cation, the court held that the "soft support" of congressional silence was
insufficient authority upon which to curtail travel to nonrestricted areas
"to achieve the objective of restraining travel to restricted areas. '' " The
court also stated that the Secretary had sufficient "authority to control
the lawful travel of the passport, even though Congress ha[d] not given
sufficient authority to control the travel of the person." 80 The combined
effect of the above is that the State Department is powerless to demand
43. 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (a)-(b) (1976).
45. 385 U.S. at 480-81.
46. 31 Fed. Reg. 13,544 (1966), codified at 22 C.F.R. § 51.74 (1967), states:
Travel to, in or through a restricted country or area without a passport or
without a passport specifically validated for such travel is ground for revoca-
tion or cancellation of a passport and for denial of an application for a pass-
port or renewal of a passport until such time as the Secretary receives formal
assurance and is satisfied that the person will not again travel in violation of
the travel restrictions. Unauthorized travel to a restricted country or area may
also be a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1185 and/or 18 U.S.C. § 1544 and subject to
penalties provided therein.
This section was subsequently repealed in 1968.
47. 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
48. Lynd agreed not to use his passport in restricted areas but he reserved the right to
travel to those areas without a passport. Id. at 942.
49. Id. at 947. It should be noted that the court sustained the Secretary's authority to
deny or to revoke a passport when the sole travel intended by the citizen is to a restricted
area.
50. Id. at 947-48. The court reached this conclusion after declaring that the passport is
an official document under government seal.
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that the person travelling refrain from travelling to the restricted region
himself, so long as his passport remains safely behind.'
These cases have pointed out that to issue and to enforce criminal
prohibitions, the State Department must have explicit congressional sup-
port. However, as yet, Congress is unprepared to make travel in banned
countries a crime. Therefore, travellers cannot be precluded from visiting
restricted areas by any punitive consequences."
In summary, the authority of the President to exercise discretion
over the issuance of passports was established with the passage of the
Passport Act of 1926.68 The power was narrowly interpreted until after
1941, when the State Department under the "national emergencies" ex-
ception began exercising its authority in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. A
number of State Department decisions drew the attention of the courts,
prompting judicial review of the Department's actions. As a result of this
judicial scrutiny, the area in which the State Department can act with
respect to the granting or revocation of passports has been more sharply
defined. The case of Philip Agee focuses, on one level, on the power of the
Secretary of State to refuse or to revoke a passport on national security
grounds. On another level it deals with the right to international travel
and the ways in which that right may be limited.
III. THE CASE OF PHILIP AGEE
As noted previously in this article, Philip Agee is a U.S. citizen and
former employee of the CIA. He has been a leading critic of the CIA's
clandestine operations throughout the world. Through his speaking en-
gagements and various publications, Agee has repeatedly identified orga-
nizations and individuals in foreign countries as participants in under-
cover CIA activities or as agents." The State Department informed Agee
of its decision to revoke his passport in a letter which said that, because
of Agee's stated intention to expose CIA activities and his extensive
travel in pursuing those intentions, his actions were damaging to the na-
tional security and foreign policy of the United States."6 On these
51. Id. at 948.
52. Hurwitz, supra note 24, at 283.
53. 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1980). See note 22 supra.
54. Between 1974 and 1978, Agee had identified hundreds of persons as CIA employees.
See generally DIRTY WORK: THE CIA IN WEsTERN EuROPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978); P.
AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975); Agee, "Introduction", in DIRTY WORK 2: THE
CIA IN AFRICA (E. Ray, W. Schapp, K. Van Meter & L. Wolf eds. 1979).
55. The important part of the State Department's letter to Agee is stated below:
The reasons for the Secretary's determination are, in summary, as follows:
Since the early 1970's it has been your stated intention to conduct a continu-
ous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations of the United States. In
carrying out that campaign you have travelled in various countries (including,
among others, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and
Germany), and your activities in those countries have caused serious damage to
the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Your stated in-
VOL. 11:15
TRAVEL: RIGHT OR PREROGATIVE?
grounds, the Secretary moved to revoke Agee's passport, relying on 22
C.F.R. sections 51.70(b)(4) and 51.71(a). Twenty-two C.F.R. section 51.70
(b)(4) provides: "A passport may be refused in any case in which: ...
The Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing
or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the for-
eign policy of the United States." Twenty-two C.F.R. section 51.71(a)
provides: "A passport may be revoked, restricted or limited where: The
national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under Sec-
tion 51.70." Agee rejected his right to administrative review and instead
filed a complaint with the district court seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.56
The district court held that the State Department regulation author-
izing passport refusal or revocation on national security or foreign policy
grounds is valid only if there is either an express or implied authorization
from Congress."' In reaching this conclusion the court adopted substan-
tial parts of Kent v. Dulles." Accepting the premise that the right to
travel is constitutionally protected,"9 the district court stated that "[tihe
Secretary of State's power to revoke or limit a passport flows from Con-
gress not from the President. . . .His power is no greater than Congress
may choose to delegate to him." 60 Finally, since the challenged action was
against a protected individual right, the court stated that any delegation
must be narrowly construed.
Finding no express authorization, the coutt then looked for a "suffi-
ciently substantial and consistent administrative practice" to warrant an
implied approval of the challenged regulation." Since its promulgation in
1968, 22 C.F.R. section 51.70(b)(4) had only been used once to revoke a
passport. Accordingly, the court held that there was not a substantial and
consistent administrative practice upon which an implied approval could
be based.*5
The State Department's main support for establishing a substantial
and consistent prior administrative practice came from various statutes,
regulations, and advisory opinions dating back to 1861. The court found
this argument unpersuasive in that the examples listed by the Secretary
of State concerned revocations under exigent circumstances. This, cou-
pled with the need to construe narrowly any purported limitation on the
protected right to travel, undermined any congressional support the legis-
tention to continue such activities threatens additional damage of the same
kind.
Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 730 n.2.
56. Id. at 730.
57. Id. at 731.
58. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
59. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 730.
60. Id. at 730.
61. Id. at 731.
62. Id.
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lation might have enjoyed." Further support for not finding tacit ap-
proval of such revocations was found in the failure of Congress to pass
proposed legislation granting the power then in question in 1958." In
sum, the Court "conclude[d] that the Secretary's promulgation was with-
out authorization from Congress"56 and thus invalid.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court." Apply-
ing essentially the same tests as the district court, the court of appeals
found no express congressional support for the regulation. 7 The court
also did not find any substantial and consistent administrative practice to
support the current regulation, stating that "[u]ntil Agee's case arose 22
C.F.R. Section 51.70(b)(4) was virtually unused."" The court did state
that if Agee were indicted or otherwise charged with criminal conduct,
past Supreme Court decisions would support revocation of his passport,
thus providing a possible method for restraining Agee."
Circuit Judge MacKinnon submitted an exhaustive dissent in which
he went to great lengths to uphold the regulation and thus the revocation
of Agee's passport.70 Judge MacKinnon found the challenged regulations
to be constitutional on their face. 71 He reached this conclusion by first
incorporating the President's power in hostage situations under 22 U.S.C.
section 1732 7 and the authority of Zemel v. Rusk.7 s The hostage situation
63. Id.
64. Id. at 732 n.. In fact two separate bills were introduced, one in 1958 and the other
in 1966, which would have permitted the denial of passports to persons whose activities or
presence abroad would "seriously impair the conduct of foreign relations" of the United
States or would "be inimical to the security of the U.S." Both bills died in committee and
were never brought to a vote on the floor. See S. 4110, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. (1958); H.R.
14895, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1966).
65. 483 F. Supp. at 732.
66. Ages v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 85-86. The Secretary's argument that the Passport Act, when combined with
the President's foreign policy powers, would uphold the regulation was again rejected. The
court also noted the two unsuccessful attempts by the Department of State, in 1958 and
1966, to have bills passed in Congress granting this power to the Secretary of State. See
note 64 supra.
68. 629 F.2d at 86.
69. Id. at 87 n.10.
70. Id. at 87. At one point Judge MacKinnon goes so far as to include a draft indict-
ment of Agee which could be used to allow revocation on the grounds of a criminal indict-
ment. Id. at 105 n.62.
71. Id. at 109.
72. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 states:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of
any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to de-
mand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears
to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the Presi-
dent shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so
demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such
means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to
obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative
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in Iran provided the necessary crisis, and on December 17, 1979 a news-
paper article reported that Agee had been invited to travel to Iran in or-
der to participate in a "tribunal" that was to judge the U.S. hostages.
7 4 If
it was in fact true that Agee was going to Iran, then it would appear that
section 1732 of the Hostage Law could support the revocation as a mea-
sure "necessary and proper. . . to effectuate the release" of the American
hostages held in Iran.
In sum, both lower court decisions considered the right to travel as a
part of the liberty "of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment.' If such a right is to be
regulated it must be pursuant to congressional action. The requisite ac-
tion must be either an express delegation or a sufficiently substantial ad-
ministrative practice to warrant implicit congressional approval. Neither
was found and thus 22 C.F.R. section 51.70 (b)(4) was declared invalid.
The Secretary of State appealed the decision and the Supreme Court de-
cided the case on June 29, 1981.10
. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court, by a seven-
to-two vote, reversed the two lower court decisions and found the regula-
tion and the subsequent passport revocation to be valid. A brief summary
of the Court's decision reveals the subtle, yet ultimately, substantial
changes in the interpretation of past cases that was necessary to reverse
the lower courts. The primary difference is the Supreme Court's focus on
the national security and foreign policy aspects of the case at the expense
of the right to travel.
7
Chief Justice Burger begins by establishing the lack of any express
statutory limitation on the Secretary of State's power to revoke a citizen's
passport or to deny a passport application. The Passport Act of 1926
states only that the "Secretary of State may grant and issue passports
.. . under such rules as the President shall designate. ... ."7 Once this
rather open-ended grant of authority is established, Chief Justice Burger
thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to
Congress.
73. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
74. N.Y. Post, Dec. 17, 1979, at 2, col. 4. Arguably, 22 U.S.C. section 1732 could apply
here since there is a broad grant of power under this statute. In comparing the situation
with Zemel, the Iranian crisis was more immediate since U.S. citizens were being held at
that time. See Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 97. It should be noted that Agee submitted a
sworn affidavit stating he was neither invited to Iran nor did he ever intend to go to Iran as
long as U.S. citizens were still held hostage. The entire link to Iran flowed from the one
uncorroborated article in the New York Post. See Brief for Appellee at 4, Haig v. Agee, 101
S. Ct. 2766 (1981).
75. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 125.
76. Haig v. Agee, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2766 (1981).
77. "The question presented is whether the President, acting through the Secretary of
State, has authority to revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's activities in foreign
countries are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign
policy of the United States." Id. at 2769.
78. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976).
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links this authority to the Executive's control over foreign policy and na-
tional security. The opinion also stresses the need for a "consistent ad-
ministrative construction" of the Passport Act."
There is an important statement, hidden in a footnote, which per-
vades the entire opinion and, arguably, distinguishes this opinion from
the two lower court opinions. After stating that congressional silence is
not to be equated with congressional disapproval, footnote twenty-one
states that "[tihis case does not involve a criminal prosecution; accord-
ingly, strict construction against the Government is not required."0
(Emphasis added.) This belief is extremely important in the outcome. of
the case, since absent an express congressional delegation of authority,
there must be a sufficiently substantial and consistent administrative
practice to find an implicit congressional authorization. The lower courts,
applying Kent, stated that given the nature of the right being affected, it
would "construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute (the
right to travel]."'' The importance of this distinction becomes obvious
given the basis upon which the State Department supported its argu-
ment: that there was a sufficiently substantial and consistent administra-
tive practice to confer implicit congressional approval. If, as the majority
opinion states, strict construction against the Government is not required,
then it is much less of a burden on the Secretary of State to show that
the required administrative practice existed. This is, in fact, what
happened.
By not requiring a narrow construction5 ' as dictated by Kent, the
Court held that there was a "sufficiently substantial and consistent" ad-
ministrative policy to conclude that Congress implicitly approved the
challenged regulation."8 This failure to require a narrow construction of
the purported delegation enabled the Court to find implicit support
where it might not otherwise have been found. Absent evidence of an in-
tent to repudiate longstanding administrative construction, the Court
"conclude[d] that Congress, in 1926, adopted the longstanding adminis-
trative construction of the 1856 statute.""
Further implicit support for the regulation was found in congres-
79. 101 S.Ct. at 2774. The Court, citing Zemel v. Rush, 381 U.S. at 17, states that "Con-
gress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs--must of necessity
paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas."
80. 101 S.Ct. at 2774 n.21.
81. 357 U.S. at 129, quoted in Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 83.
82. See also Justice Brennan's dissent in Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. at 2785.
83. Id. at 2781.
84. Id. at 2777. The Court found that the 1856 Passport Act, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 60
(1856), granted the Secretary of State wide powers, based upon the Executive's control over
foreign policy. Then, citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 675 (1977), to the effect that Con-
gress is presumed to be aware of administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute when
it reenacts a statute without change, the Court implied that the 1926 Passport Act adopted
the early broad construction.
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sional silence in the face of administrative policy." The cases cited by the
Court" stand for the proposition that "acquieqcence by Congress in an
administrative practice may be an inference from silence during a period
of years. ' 87 (Emphasis added.) The Court refused to construe this nar-
rowly and applied their method of implicit approval to an administrative
regulation that had only been invoked once in twelve years. Congressional
silence can only be meaningful when there is an exercise of executive dis-
cretion, as opposed to the mere possession of the discretion." By substi-
tuting the administrative policy requirement for the administrative prac-
tice requirement, the Court both strays from the holding of Kent and
belittles the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment."s
In his dissent Justice Brennan notes and criticizes the majority opin-
ion's alteration of past cases. In response to the argument that silence can
be seen as implicit approval of a regulation, he states:
Only when Congress had maintained its silence in the face of a consis-
tent and substantial pattern of actual passport denials or revoca-
tions-where the parties will presumably object loudly, perhaps
through legal action, to the Secretary's exercise of discretion-can this
Court be sure that Congress is aware of the Secretary's actions and
has implicitly approved that exercise of discretion."
The dissent further points out that much of the material the majority
opinion uses to support its conclusion was "expressly abjured in Kent v.
Duties.""I
There are certain situations, as noted by Justice Brennan in his dis-
sent, when bad facts make bad law. Unfortunately, the law that results
can reassert itself at inopportune moments and, in this situation, allow
the regulation to inhibit travel of those persons who merely seek to criti-
cize government policy."2 Philip Agee and his purported activities influ-
enced the majority of the Court to focus upon the national security and
foreign policy issues of the case, while silently dismantling the holding in
85. 101 S.Ct. at 2778.
86. Udall.v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 313 (1933); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932).
87. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. at 313.
88. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Haig v. Agee, 101 S.Ct. at 2786. Contrary to both
past cases and the underlying purpose in requiring an administrative practice as the indica-
tor of implicit congressional support, the majority opinion stated that "if there were no
occasions-or few to call the Secretary's authority into play, the absence of frequent in-
stances of enforcement is wholly irrelevant." Id. at 2779.
89. Chief Justice Burger differentiates between the interstate right to travel and the
right to travel internationally-the former being virtually unqualified, while the latter is
considered "no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifti Amendment." Id. at 2782. The point the Court conveniently overlooks is that the
regulation of this right to international travel is limited to either express congressional limi-
tations or the administrative practice requirement discussed above.
90. Id. at 2786.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2788 n.9.
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Kent. 9 While his actions could be perceived as harming the national se-
curity, the opinion, a§ written, has a potentially much broader
application.
It is interesting to note that this particular controversy could have
and probably should have been avoided altogether. Kent recognized that
passport revocations are authorized when the applicant has engaged in
and been indicted for illegal conduct." As noted by Judge MacKinnon in
his dissent, it appears that Agee could have been indicted for violating
the Willful Communication of Defense Information Statute." ' Agee dis-
closed the identity of undercover CIA agents and CIA sources and meth-
ods throughout the world. These acts were clear violations of the above
statute. But since Agee was not indicted for any crime, the Court was
forced to look to other methods to limit his travel. Prior to the Supreme
Court's reversal of the two lower courts, it appeared that this oversight
would have a substantial effect on the freedom of Philip Agee. It now
appears that the Department of State actually increased its ability to act
freely through its nonreliance on the criminal indictment.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT To TRAVEL
In determining what degree of protection and what due process re-
quirements a particular activity merits, it is necessary to consider the im-
portance or advantages of the activity both to the individual and to the
State." The fact that travel is important is evidenced by the number of
people it affects. As transportation methods improve, the world becomes
a relatively smaller place; and as standards of living rise, more people are
travelling abroad. Beyond the sheer number of people who travel abroad,
the purposes behind those travels are also important." An individual's
occupation may require overseas travel. For example, foreign correspon-
dents and lecturers are required to travel. Even if not necessary, it may
be of great potential value in the successful conduct of an individual's
profession. Businessmen and students may benefit greatly from travel
abroad. These reasons suggest that free movement may be basic to any
93. See Justice Blackmun's concurrence, id. at 2783-84.
94. 357 U.S. at 127. This point is noted and developed in Judge MacKinnon's dissent in
Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 104-05.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1976). It states:
Whoever, lawfully having possession of ... information relating to the na-
tional defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communi-
cated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit
or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any persqn
not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on
demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it
... [slhall be fined. .. or imprisoned... or both.
96. See Note, Passport Refusals, supra note 24, at 190.
97. Id. at 191.
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guarantee of freedom of opportunity."s Reasons for travel abroad also in-
clude those closer to the core of personal life, such as marriage and re-
uniting families. Finally, the need for a free and fully informed society is
basic to. the protection of a citizen's "right to know.' "
What transpires abroad has a definite impact on matters of domestic
as well as foreign policy.10 Freedom of mobility is essential in a demo-
cratic society. One of the first acts of any totalitarian system is to gain
control of the information channels and to repress the free movement of
the population in order to control and to influence what information and
opinions reach its people. The denial of freedom of movement is a warn-
ing that other repressions are likely to follow.1 '
Given the importance of travel to our democratic society, it is sur-
prising to find that nowhere in our federal constitution is there an ex-
pressed right to travel freely. Consequently, questions arose as to the na-
ture and extent of the ordinary freedom of an American.citizen to leave
his country and return as he or she pleases. Controversial passport refus-
als on the vague basis that the intended travel would not be in the "best
interests of the United States" began to receive public attention. In re-
sponse to this public concern, the courts began to focus on the problem
and a judicially constructed right to travel began to emerge.1"
In Bauer v. Acheson,'os a district court rejected the State Depart-
ment's claim of absolute discretion in the issuance of passports. The
plaintiff, an American journalist working in Paris, had her passport re-
voked without a hearing or notice. The Secretary of State refused to re-
view or validate her passport except to allow her return to the United
States, explaining that the plaintiff's activities were not in the best inter-
ests of the United States.104 By connecting international travel to the lib-
erty of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the court ex-
pressed the novel view that a right to foreign travel existed in the
Constitution."' However, the court cautioned that the right to travel
abroad was not an absolute right but was subject to reasonable regulation,
over which the Secretary of State had "wide", though not absolute, dis-
98. Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IowA L. Rav. 6, 12 (1955).
99. Note, The Right to Travel Abroad, 42 FORDHAM L. Rsv. 838, 840 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Right to Travel Abroad]. While the "right to know" is an important personal
right, the Court in Zemel v. Rush would not validate the passport of a U.S. citizen to travel
to Cuba when the citizen desired to inform himself of the conditions in Cuba. The foreign
policy considerations were sufficient to carry the day as the Court rejected appelant's First
Amendment claims and distinguished Kent v. Dules, which dealt with an individual's be-
liefs. See also notes 124-27 infra and accompanying text.
100. Note, Passport Refusals, supra note 24, at 191.
101. Vestal, supra note 98, at 13.
102. See Note, Right to Travel Abroad, supra note 99, at 839.
103. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
104. Id. at 448.
105. Id. at 451.
1981
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
cretion.'" Bauer thus applied the standards of procedural due process to
the methods by which the federal government could restrict travel. The
significance of this case was its "recognition of the . . . conflict between
the right of international travel and the privilege of retaining a valid
passport.''0o7
The case of Schachtman v. Dulles,' 0 whose facts were discussed ear-
lier, considered whether a passport refusal to the national chairman of
the Independent Socialist League was arbitrary, thus raising substantive
due process issues.10' In the court of appeals opinion, the judge stated
that the right to travel was a "natural right" which must be accorded due
process protection." 0
The Supreme Court did not review either of the above two cases,
since the Secretary of State acquiesced and granted the parties their
passports. As mentioned earlier, the Supreme. Court in Kent held that
"the right to travel is a.part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." '' The
question left open and which the Agee case dealt with concerned what
process was actually due and to what extent the right to travel could be
regulated. Nevertheless, Kent did propound a rule of law sufficient to en-
able the Court to declare section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950112 to be unconstitutional on its face in Aptheker v. Secretary
of State."'3
The Aptheker opinion has been interpreted in two different ways,
differing on whether it is a First or Fifth Amendment decision. The first
interpretation is that the right to travel, since it is closely linked to the
personal rights of the First Amendment, deserves greater protection and
a preferred status to that of other property rights protected by the Fifth
Amendment. This would extend the Fifth Amendment protection for the
right to travel beyond the substantive due process rule of reasonable-
ness.'1 4 The second interpretation is more widely accepted and views the
First Amendment rights to be related to the right to travel in only certain
106. Id. at 451-52.
107. Note, Passports and Freedom of Travel: The Conflict of a Right and a Privilege,
41 GEo. L.J. 63, 85 (1952).
108. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
109. Id. at 941. 1
110. Id. While the court held that the right to travel was a natural right, it did ac-
knowledge that such right was subject to reasonable regulation under law. Further, in deter-
mining what is arbitrary, the court said one must consider the circumstances during which
the act occurs. Thus, times of national emergency could expand the boundaries of what is
reasonable.
111. 357 U.S. at 125.
112. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 6, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
113. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The Court found that the provision which made it a crime for
a member of a Communist organization to apply for a passport, "swerptl too widely and too
indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 514. See
notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text. ,
114. See Right to Travel Abroad, supra note 99, at 842.
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specific situations, and only in these situations would it therefore be
treated as a preferred right."16 If the right to travel in a particular case
involved no First Amendment rights, it would receive no extra protection.
The question becomes what would happen to travel situations which did
not involve any First Amendment personal rights?
The concept of a First Amendment guarantee of the right to travel
was rejected in 1965 by the Court in Zemel v. Rusk."' In rejecting
Zemel's First Amendment claim, the Court distinguished Kent and
Aptheker which were concerned with individual denials based on depriva-
tion of the rights of expression and association.'1 7 Zemel's right to travel
was a due process right and was controlled by the balancing test of the
Fifth Amendment." 8 The Court found the restriction on travel to Cuba
to be supported by "the weightiest considerations of national security,""'
thus shifting the balance in favor of the State Department.
Therefore, against this backdrop of judicial opinions, the right to
travel has been most frequently found within the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. The case of Woodward v. Rogers" reaffirms this implica-
tion. In this case, a federal district court held that the denial of a pass-
port to the plaintiffs who refused to swear an oath of allegiance was viola-
tive of their constitutional right to travel derived from the Fifth
Amendment. There must be a governmental need for instituting loyalty
oaths. Where a governmental purpose is supported by an overriding and
substantial national interest and does not "unduly ...infringe upon a
constitutionally protected freedom," the measure will be upheld."' It was
the national interest which was lacking in Woodward. In applying the
Fifth Amendment due process requirement, there must be a balance be-
tween the individual right and the governmental interest in question.
In review, prior to the decision in Haig v. Agee, there appeared to be
substantial support for the proposition that the right to travel interna-
tionally was a right contained in and protected by the Fifth Amendment.
This basic individual right could not be diminished unless done in a fash-
ion consistent with the due process requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment. According to Kent and its progeny, any attempt to limit this right
had to be construed narrowly. Yet, as shown above, Haig v. Agee dis-
carded this requirement and in fact stated that since no criminal indict-
ment was involved, strict construction against the Government was not
115. Id. at 843.
116. 381 U.S. at 16.
117. See Right to Travel Abroad, supra note 99, at 844.
118. 381 U.S. at 14-16. The Court states that "[tihe requirements of due process are a
function not only of the extent of the governmental restriction imposed, but also of the
extent of the necessity of the restriction."
119. Id. at 16.
120. 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972). The court also held that any infringement on the
right to travel will be narrowly construed as called for by Kent v. Dulles. Id. at 982.
121. Note, Constitutional Law-Loyalty Oaths Obstructing Civil Liberties, 19
N.Y.L.F. 185, 186 (1973).
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necessary.3 22 While it certainly appeared that a legitimate national inter-
est existed in Agee's case, the decision nevertheless was reached at the
expense of the right to travel when the Court found implicit approval for
the regulation after considering only administrative policy and not ad-
ministrative practice. Thus, the protection afforded this right was
diminished.
The right to free travel is not awarded the same amount of impor-
tance in all countries. For example, in the Australian system there is no
right to free international travel since there is no absolute right to a pass-
port."' Other countries have adopted similar policies which restrict free
travel in varying degrees. Only recently have many countries recognized
the advantages of free travel between nations.1 " Some examples of those
contributions to free travel follow.
V. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS AT FREE TRAVEL
Extending free travel abroad has been possible through the coopera-
tion of different countries. An early indication of this cooperation was
demonstrated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10,
1948." I' Article 13 includes the following declaration: "(1) Everyone has
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each State. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country including his
own, and to return to his country." The commitment of the United Na-
tions to the goal of extending free travel was an important step towards
the universal recognition of a basic right to freedom of movement."*6
Probably the most effective example of multinational efforts at free
travel is the European Economic Community (EEC). The treaty estab-
lishing this international organization was adopted- in 1957.1"' The
treaty's goals are economic rather than political, and consist of eliminat-
ing barriers to the free exchange of goods and promoting the free move-
ment of persons, services, and capital. It requires member states to aban-
don immigration restrictions on the entry of Community workers and to
122. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
123. Jaconelly, The Justice Report on Passports, 38 MOD. L. Rv. 314, 315 (1975).
124. D. TuRAcK, supra note 1, at 23.
125. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
126. Global implementation of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights has had its shortcomings although its influence is apparent in the constitutions of
new states. The absence of any compulsory mechanism to guarantee the declaration's effec-
tiveness has been one of its problems, although it has manifested a great political impact on
both the international and national levels. See A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RITowrs IN NA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 passim (1968). On the status of the Universal Declara-
tion in international law, see Sohm, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, J. INT'L
COMMISSION JURS. 17 (1967).
127. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25. 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome).
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treat Community workers as nationals with respect to employment oppor-
tunities and conditions."' The major advantages of the EEC are the ef-
fective allocation of manpower resources in a single common market and
the conditions which provide workers with a chance to improve their
standard of living.38
However, limitations to the effectiveness of the EEC are that the
treaty includes two exceptions to the principle of free movement of labor.
First is that free movement is not guaranteed to "public service" employ-
ees."" Second is the "public policy exception" which specifies that free
movement is made subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security, or public health. "" The current interpretation of
public policy by the European Court of Justice has been to allow each
member state discretion in defining and applying it. This interpretation
has interfered with the objectives of free movement of workers, and many
critics have advocated a more restrictive interpretation.' "
Another multilateral effort aimed at free travel occurred in 1962
when the U.N. study on the right to free travel was completed.'8" Under
the sponsorship of the Commission of Human Rights, and more specifi-
cally its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, Dr. Ingl6s was appointed to prepare a study concerning the
right of any person to leave and to return to his country. The study sur-
veyed the practice of ninety states on the subject and reported that only
twenty-four states constitutionally recognized the right of a national to
leave his or her country, while twelve states recognized the right to judi-
cial interpretation.'" Dr. Ingl6s offered a draft of specific proposals for
national and international action to ensure freedom and nondiscrimina-
tion in the enjoyment of the right of international mobility.'
The following year, a U.N. Conference on International-Travel and
Tourism was held in Rome.13' Among other things, the Conference en-
couraged states to minimize requirements and simplify procedures when
issuing passports."7 On December 21, 1965, the General Assembly ap-
128. Reisner, National Regulation of the Movement of Workers in the European Eco-
nomic Community, 13 AM. J. Comp. L. 360 (1964).
129. Singer, Free Movement of Workers in the European Economic Community: The
Public Policy Exception, 29 STAw. L. Rav. 1283 (1977).
130. Treaty of Rome, supra note 127, art. 48(4).
131. Id. art. 48(3).
132. Singer, note 129 supra.
133. Ingl6s, Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave Any
Country, Including His Own, and to Return to His Country, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/229/
Rev.1 (1963).
134. Id. at 4.
135. Turack, Freedom of Movement and the Travel Document, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L. REv.
8, 12 & n.26 (1973).
136. U.N. Conference on International Travel and Tourism. Recommendations on In-
ternational Travel and Tourism, U.N. E/CONF. 47/18 (1964).
137. Turack, supra note 135, at 12.
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proved the text of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination which was then opened for signature by
the member states.138 Each state which ratifies or adheres to the Conven-
tion undertakes to eliminate racial discrimination and to guarantee the
right of everyone to equality before the law in the enjoyment of free
travel.185 Unlike the Universal Declaration, the International Convention
is a treaty and will become legally binding on every country which ratifies
it once the treaty enters into force. The machinery provided in the Con-
vention will assure greater protection of this human right when
implemented.
Another effective method of extending freedom of movement is the
formation of passport unions. Under this type of agreement, the passport
requirement is waived for nationals of states comprising the union, while
others must present their passport for initial entry or departure from the
union's territory. There are a number of conditions which are necessary
for the existence of a passport union which include a common labor mar-
ket, close proximity of countries, and similar immigration policies. Two of
the multistate passport unions existing today are the Scandanavian Pass-
port Union consisting of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the
Benelux Passport Union consisting of Belgium, The Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. 1 0
A final application of efforts to promote free travel which will be
mentioned is the Helsinki Accord of 1975'41 and the subsequent Belgrade
Conference of 1977. The Helsinki Accord was a conference on security
and cooperation in Europe and the Belgrade Conference was a review and
assessment of the Helsinki process. The Conference established a number
of principles of governmental conduct concerning freedom of transna-
tional movement which attempted to balance the objectives of free mobil-
ity of persons and respect for the sovereign state's rights." '
The multilateral efforts at free travel which have been mentioned are
quite varied in their effectiveness and the results they have achieved.
However, they are all attempts to promote free travel for individuals be-
tween countries and they are instrumental in establishing an interna-
tional recognition of a fundamental right to free travel.
138. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
139. Id. art. 5(d)(ii). See Turack, note 135 supra.
140. Turack, supra note 135, at 20-27 gives a brief discussion of the history behind each
passport union.
141.. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug.1, 1975, re-
printed in 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975); also reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). See
HUMAN RiGHTs, INTRNATIONAL LAW AND THm Has mNr AccoiD (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977).
142. See Turack, Freedom of Trananational Movement: The Helsinki Accord and Be-
yond, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1978).
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VI. CONCLUSION
While travel and mobility have become indispensable in our society,
there still exist restrictions on the exercise of that right. Now that the
passport has become an essential travel document, the lack of one is a
major restraint on international mobility. The State Department may
now prevent a person from travelling internationally by not issuing or
revoking his passport. As the State Department has exercised this power,
the courts have become involved in an effort to clarify and to delineate
the powers of the State Department. In the past, courts have upheld
passport denials or revocations in cases involving area restrictions and
when a person has been indicted for a criminal offense. Now, revocations
are possible in situations where the Secretary of State determines that
the person's activities "are causing or are likely to cause serious damage
to the national security or the foreign policy of the United
States .... 148 Since Kent it has been accepted judicially that the right
to international travel may be regulated.1"4 Kent also established the fact
that this right is a part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment
and that any regulation of this right must be pursuant to either an ex-
press or implicit congressional delegation. The Agee case dealt with im-
plicit authorization and, contrary to the holding in Kent, the Court did
not construe narrowly the implied delegation. A sufficiently substantial
and consistent administrative policy, not practice, was found in past
State Department actions. This was so even though the challenged regu-
lation had only been used once prior to the case.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court placed undue emphasis on the
foreign policy aspect of the passport question. This increased the State
Department's area of discretion at the expense of the individual's right to
international travel. There is no express constitutional protection of the
right to travel. The basis of this right has traditionally been found in the
First and Fifth Amendments. The broadening in the balancing of the in-
terests of the Secretary of State's discretion must. then be seen as an in-
fringement on the above-enumerated amendments. Freedom of speech
and the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment take on new meanings
when seen in an international context, as these rights must be balanced
against national and foreign policy interests. This balancing is in fact a
limitation on the above rights.
143. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1981).
144. It is important to reiterate that the Agee case deals with international travel. The
Court, citing Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978), clearly distinguishes interstate
travel from international travel. Haig v. Agee, 101 S.Ct. at 2782.
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